This study examines the role of pawnshops as a risk-coping strategy in Japan in the prewar period when poor people were highly vulnerable. Using data on pawnshop loans in more than 250 municipalities and the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic as a natural experiment, we find that the total loan amount increased because of the pandemic shock. Our results suggest that those who regularly relied on pawnshops borrowed from them more money than usual to cope with the adverse health shock, whereas others did not take out pawnshop loans. In addition, further analyses reveal that loans from pawnshops prevented an increase in the unemployment rate due to the pandemic. Pawnshops thus served as an informal social insurance mechanism in early twentieth-century Japan.
Introduction
Most industrialized countries were characterized by huge income inequality before World War II (Piketty 2014) . Since formal systems of social insurance were underdeveloped, the poor were more vulnerable to unforeseen accidents such as illness than today's poor people in developed countries. Furthermore, an increase in migration removed people from the traditional informal social insurance systems provided by their local communities (Gorsky 1998) .
Given the foregoing, many studies have examined how low-income people smoothed their consumption under earnings shocks in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
1 Kiesling (1996) demonstrated that workers in Lancashire generally relied on informal sources such as savings, intrafamily transfers, and personal networks around the time of the cotton famine (1861-1865). Horrell and Oxley (2000) found that informal strategies, such as eliciting labor force participation by family members and reducing rent, were more important for industrial households in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century than benefits from formal institutions. In Helsinki in the 1920s, Saaritsa (2008) pointed out the importance of informal transfers between friends, relatives, and neighbors. In addition, Saaritsa (2011) found that informal assistance contributed to smoothing the income of worker households in 1928. James and Suto (2011) showed that Japanese workers in the 1910s and 1920s tended to have postal savings, which helped them smooth consumption. Ogasawara (2018a) used data on working class households in Osaka around 1920 to confirm that the response of borrowing to idiosyncratic shocks was greater than that of other income sources.
These studies indicate that informal sources such as savings and borrowing were widely used to mitigate earnings shocks. Their findings, however, are based on household data in limited areas or industries. Few studies cover the whole of a county. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) and Scott and Walker (2012) covered the whole of Ireland and Britain, respectively, but little is known about risk-coping behavior in the face of unexpected shocks. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) focused on showing that microcredit societies (i.e., loan funds) were better than banks at lending to the poor in the 1940s. Scott and Walker (2012) examined expenditure smoothing during expenditure crises of the family lifecycle rather than under exogenous shocks. To bridge this knowledge gap, we focus on pawnshops, which spread far and wide in early twentieth-century Japan. Our observations consist of over 250 municipalities (i.e., cities and counties) across Japan.
Private pawnshops, which date back to the Kamakura period (1185-1333), were the primary financial institutions for poor people in Japan even in the 1920s, in contrast to Western countries (see Murhem 2015; Saarista 2011, p.107; Scott and Walker 2012, p.798) . Surprisingly, they provided approximately 25 million loans per year. Indeed, pawnshops even accepted inexpensive goods, such as clothes, as pawns. Thus, even poor people could access loans. In addition, people could obtain small short-term loans as needed. This feature was suitable as a risk-coping strategy.
To investigate the response of borrowing from pawnshops to an unforeseen shock, we use data on loans from pawnshops at the municipality level and exploit the [1918] [1919] [1920] influenza pandemic as a natural experiment to identify the impact of health shocks on pawnshop loans. Our main findings are as follows. First, the amount of pawnshop loans rose by 3.73-5.00% in the influenza pandemic years. This effect was similar in cities and counties. In addition, the redemption rate, which was approximately 90% in the 1910s and 1920s, was unchanged in the pandemic years. These results suggest that poor people used pawnshop loans to cope with health shocks. Second, the pandemic increased average loan amounts, whereas the frequency of loans was not affected. This result indicates that those who usually relied on pawnshops borrowed intensively under a health shock, but others did not use pawnshops-even under an unexpected shock. Finally, an increase in pawnshop loans mitigated an adverse effect of the pandemic on the economy. Our estimation results based on census data for 1920 indicate that borrowing from pawnshops offset the negative impact of the influenza pandemic on the unemployment rate.
The present study contributes to the literature in the following three ways. First, it provides evidence that consumption was smoothed by pawnshop loans throughout Japan in both urban and rural areas. The natural experiment of the influenza pandemic even enables us to identify the response to an unexpected shock. Second, this study shows the role of financial institutions for poor people at the time of a health shock, using historical data from the prewar period. In development economics, there are a number of studies on risk sharing (e.g., Gertler and Gruber 2002; Lee and Sawada 2010; Liu 2016; Sawada and Takasaki 2017) . Moreover, the growing body of the literature has revealed that microfinance helps households smooth consumption when health shocks occur (see Gertler et al. 2009; Islam and Maitra 2012) . This study contributes to this stream of the development literature. Finally, in the context of Japanese financial history, it provides a general quantitative view on pawnshops in contrast to previous studies based on a small number of cases (e.g., Ioku and Shizume 2014; Saito 1989; Shibuya et al. 1982) . Further, in terms of the role of pawnshops, whereas the traditional view has emphasized the negative aspects (Shibuya et al. 1982) , we shed light on the positive economic role for poor people.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of pawnshops in Japan around 1920 and presents the features of the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic. Section 3 describes the data used and our estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
Background

Pawnshops in Japan around 1920
In modern Japan, pawnshops were widely prevalent nationwide. Although data encompassing all pawnshops are scarce, we can obtain data on the number of pawnshops and both the amount and the frequency of loans, redemption, and foreclosure in every prefecture in 1924 from the Social Affairs Bureau (1926) . This information is divided into city areas and county areas. Panel A of Table 1 shows several indices calculated based on the above data. It is noteworthy that there were many pawnshops-17,807 in total, or 379 per prefecture. For comparison purposes, we present the numbers of other financial institutions as well as pawnshops again in Panel B of Table 1 . As shown, the number of pawnshops was 2.5 and 66.5 times greater than that of ordinary banks and mutual loan 1935) . This survey also showed that borrowing from relatives or friends only occurred 20.50% of the time. This means that poor people were more reliant on pawnshops than on their personal networks.
The reasons that pawnshops were popular are as follows. First, they accepted even inexpensive goods as pawns. In a way, a need for a pawn helped poor people, who could not access credit because they were usually considered to be unreliable, borrow money as long as they had some good. Additionally, borrowers could avoid any trouble other than foreclosure if they did not redeem their pawn (Saito 1989, p.5) .
3 Therefore, it seems that a loan with an inexpensive pawn was preferable for the poor to that without any pawns.
4 Shibuya et al. (1982) reported the numbers of pawns by their types based on the pawn ledgers of a pawnshop in January and June 1917. It is striking that clothes accounted for 88.97% of all pawns, whereas other types of pawns had much smaller shares: 2.77% were piece goods (tanmono), 1.24% mosquito nets, 1.18% Japanese futons, 1.06% accessories, and 0.48% watches. Obviously, most people borrowed money from pawnshops against their own clothes.
Inexpensive clothes were pledgeable because Japan had a well-developed secondhand clothing market (Francks 2012) . In Japan, pawnshops usually followed traditions and customs rather than the Act on Control of Pawnbroking. Thus, in accordance with customs, they sold goods in foreclosure to antiquarians, whereas the pawnshops in other countries usually sold unredeemed goods by public auction. Moreover, each pawnshop had profit-and-loss responsibility for the sale because it owned goods in foreclosure (Tokyo Pawnshop Association 1934) . Therefore, the secondhand clothing market was essential for pawnshops to regard clothing as a pawn as well as to survive.
Second, people could borrow small short-term loans at any time. Poor people often faced a shortage of living costs because of unexpected events such as illness, and thus their borrowing from pawnshops was mainly used for consumption (Shibuya 2000) . Hence, it was important for the poor to be able to borrow as needed. In addition, specific features of pawnshop loans, namely short term and small amounts, freed borrowers from a large interest burden. Since Japanese pawnshops did not intend to reduce poverty but were profit-oriented, their interest rates were not low.
5 The maximum monthly interest regulated by the law depended on the amount of a loan: it was 0.1 yen, 4%, 3%, and 2.5% if the loan amount was under 0.25, 1, 5, and 10 yen, respectively.
6 However, this interest rate seemed to matter little because borrowers repaid their loans before the interest ballooned. Indeed, Shibuya et al. (1982) provided an example that shows that 63.12% of loans from a pawnshop were repaid within a month even though pawnshop loans usually had repayment terms of six months.
1918-1920 influenza pandemic
The 1918-1920 influenza pandemic known as "Spanish flu" is one of the deadliest pandemics in history. During this period, 500 million people were infected and 50-100 million people died from influenza worldwide (Taubenberger and Morens 2006) . Japan also experienced the pandemic with two waves whose peaks were in November 1918 and January 1920 (Ogasawara 2018b ). According to the Sanitary Bureau of the Home Department (1922), which was the most comprehensive contemporary survey, there were 23,580,495 affected people (i.e., more than 40% of the population) and 385,029 influenza deaths in Japan between August 1918 and July 1920. However, this loss has been considered to be underestimated because of problems with determining cause of death and missing data. Therefore, Hayami (2006) and Richard et al. (2009) estimated the number of excess deaths between 1918 and 1920 as approximately 453,000 and 481,000, respectively. Their estimates suggest that the actual death toll associated with the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic was much larger than the reported death toll.
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One of the well-known features of the pandemic is the age distribution of mortality. Young adults experienced the highest risk of influenza death in 1918-1920, whereas influenza usually strikes the very young and the elderly (Gagnon et al. 2013; Langford 2002; Ogasawara 2017; Richard et al. 2009 ). This characteristic supports that the influenza pandemic caused an adverse health shock and a subsequent negative income shock to working people, as Karlsson et al. (2014) revealed that the pandemic led to a significant increase in poorhouse rates in Sweden.
Further, Spanish flu was unexpected, disappeared quickly, and affected a large proportion of the population at random (Karlsson et al. 2014) . Owing to such characteristics, the pandemic has been widely used as a natural experiment in recent years (e.g., Acquah et al. 2017; Almond 2006; Brainerd and Siegler 2003; Lin and Liu 2014; Percoco 2016) . In addition to the above advantages, the timing and intensity of the pandemic varied throughout Japan (Hayami 2006; Ogasawara 2017; Richard et al. 2009 ). Hence, we can use this regional heterogeneity for our estimation.
However, there is a paucity of available data on the influenza death toll at the county level. Therefore, we use the crude death rate, defined as the number of all deaths per 1,000 people, as a measure of the shock by the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic. Fig. 1 illustrates the average crude death rate and influenza death rate of prefectures where our observations are recorded, from 1915 to 1924. Obviously, these two death rates showed a similar trend during this period. In particular, not only the influenza death rate, but also the crude death rate rose dramatically in the pandemic years. This similarity allows us to use the crude death rate as a measure to exploit the exogenous pandemic in our regression analyses.
Data and estimation strategy
Our main data sources are the statistical yearbooks annually published by each Japanese prefectural government (Fuken tokeisho). From these statistical yearbooks, we can obtain data on the population, death toll, and pawnshops at the city and county levels. Unfortunately, however, the data on death toll and pawnshops are only separately available Number of deaths per 1,000 people 1 9 1 5 1 9 1 6 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 8 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 0 1 9 2 1 1 9 2 2 1 9 2 3 1 9 2 4 Year Average crude death rate Average influenza death rate for some prefectures. Therefore, we compiled unbalanced panel data from 273 municipalities (i.e., 36 cities and 237 counties) in 19 prefectures between 1915 and 1924. Fig. 2 illustrates the spatial distribution of the prefectures where our sample cities and counties are recorded. Our observations are nationwide except in the Chubu region (central Japan). For comparison purposes, we calculated the amount of loans per pawnshop in 1924 based on our sample and the final column in Table 1 ; the results are 6,905 yen and 7,717 yen, respectively. The latter is larger than the former but heavily dependent on Tokyo. Recalculated excluding Tokyo, the latter value becomes 6,696 yen, which is close to the former.
To investigate how many pawnshop loans people took out to compensate for losses due to illness, we employ the following fixed effects approach as our identification strategy. Our baseline model is given by
where i indexes municipalities from 1 to 273, j indexes prefectures from 1 to 19, and t indexes years from 1915 to 1924. The dependent variable y it is the logarithm of the total amount of pawnshop loans, CDR it is the crude death rate (%), Pawnshop it is the number of pawnshops, Population it is the logarithm of the population, x jt is a vector of the control variables at the prefecture level, and it is a random error term. 8 ν i and µ t represent the municipality and year fixed effects, respectively.
The variable CDR is of interest. By taking advantage of the exogenous shock, namely the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic, we estimate the coefficient γ, which measures the Since we should consider the heterogeneity of the ease of access to pawnshops in terms of geographical proximity, the number of pawnshops is included in our estimation model as the measure.
9 The population indicates the number of possible borrowers. Thus, a growing population was likely to lead to an increase in the loan amount.
As mentioned above, the health shock caused by the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic was exogenous. However, the crude death rate consists of not only deaths related to the pandemic but also unrelated deaths. This means that some factors in the error term might correlate with the unrelated deaths included in the crude death rate. To deal with this possible endogeneity, we employ the following control variables at the prefecture level. First, we control for the income level by using the logarithm of unit rice yields following Schneider and Ogasawara (2018) . Although the pandemic struck randomly regardless of wealth level, some deaths not associated with the pandemic might be correlated to income. Hence, we exclude this possible correlation from our regression analyses. Second, the number of doctors per 100 people is included. This variable represents opportunities for consulting a doctor that are likely to decrease non-pandemic-related deaths in general (Inoue and Ogasawara 2018) . These variables are our main controls. Third, we use the out-of-school rate (OOSR) for children of primary school age as a measure of poverty. Since the primary school enrollment rate in Japan was already 99.03 % in 1920 (Archives Division of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Education 1925), the OOSR (i.e., 100 − the enrollment rate) seems to capture the proportion of the poorest households, which were generally unhealthier. Finally, we include the logarithm of the livestock population. This variable is interpreted as another measure of wealth. In addition to the aforementioned control variables, we use municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. These fixed effects control for all unobservable factors, including those constant over time, such as geographical characteristics, and those constant across municipalities, such as the impact of World War I. Appendix A describes our data sources for the control variables. (3) show the estimates using only the municipality-level variables. In columns (4)-(6), we control for the influences of income and medical treatment. The results in columns (7)-(9) report the estimates from our baseline specification in which we include all the control variables. Further, there is a great difference in the amount of pawnshop loans between cities and counties, as shown in Panel A of Table 1 . To consider this disparity, we conduct analyses using different samples. Columns (1), (4), and (7); (2), (5), and (8); and (3), (6), and (9) present our estimation results for both cities and counties, cities, and counties, respectively.
Estimation results
Effects of pandemic on pawnshop loans
Columns (1)- (3) in Table 2 show that the crude death rate had a significantly positive effect on the amount of pawnshop loans. The estimated coefficients of CDR remain positive and significant even when we control for other factors to address the possible endogeneity, as shown in columns (4)-(9). These results are consistent with our hypothesis, suggesting that poor people used a pawnshop loan to cope with exogenous adverse health shocks. Moreover, the estimated coefficients of the crude death rate are stable in both cities or counties. Indeed, columns (2) and (3) report almost the same coefficients. Even after including the control variables, the magnitude in cities, which is 0.011 as shown in columns (5) and (8), is similar to that in counties shown in columns (6) and (9). Therefore, it is likely that there was no difference between cities and counties in terms of the increase in pawnshop loans attributed to the unexpected health shock. Table 2 also shows the other estimated coefficients as follows. The number of pawnshops is only positively correlated to the loan amount in counties. One possible reason for this result is that there were too many pawnshops in cities around 1920.
10 Thus, it is likely that a small increase or decrease in the number of pawnshops no longer had any 10 Although Panel A of Table 1 shows that the number of pawnshops in a county area was approximately twice that in a city area, the number of counties was 7.7 times greater than that of cities in 1920. Therefore, there were many more pawnshops in cities than in counties. Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the total amount of pawnshop loans. Details of the data sources of each variable used in the regressions are provided in the text and Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
effects on the ease of access to them in cities. The coefficients of the population and rice yield correspond to our expectations. The negative coefficients of Doctor might indicate that the cost of consulting a doctor was lower than the cost of the decline in productivity caused by a health shock if someone did not receive medical treatment.
11 The OOSR has a positive correlation with the pawnshop loan amount but this result is insignificant in cities. This finding is consistent with the fact that out-of-school children were concentrated in counties. No relationships are observed between the amount of loans and livestock population.
To examine the intensive and extensive margins, we conduct further estimates by Eq. (1) using the logarithm of the average loan amount (AveLoan) and the logarithm of the frequency of loans (FreLoan) as the dependent variable instead.
12 The estimated coefficients of AveLoan and FreLoan are interpreted as the effects on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of CDR for both AveLoan in the second column and FreLoan in the third column. The main controls in the fourth column mean Rice and Doctor and the additional controls in the fifth column mean OOSR and Livestock. Panel A of Table 3 shows the results for the full sample. For the average loan amount, the estimation results are significantly positive and stable across the different specifications. This finding indicates that people borrowed more money than usual from pawnshops when they hit hard times due to the pandemic. The results for counties in Panel C are similar to the results in Panel A, while the results for cities in Panel B are positive but insignificant. Considering that the magnitudes of the estimated Notes: The second and third columns present the estimated coefficients of CDR and its standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. All regressions include Pawnshop and Population. Details of the data sources of each variable used in the regressions are provided in the text and Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
coefficients in Panel B are nearly equal to those in Panel C, it seems that the reason for the insignificance is the paucity of observations. By contrast, there are no relationships between the frequency of loans and crude death rate. This finding implies that only those who usually borrowed from pawnshops, who were likely to be poor, took out pawnshop loans to mitigate the adverse shock. In other words, our results suggest that a negative shock increased the intensive margin of pawnshop loans but had no impact on the extensive margin. Our possible explanation is that those who did not usually take out a pawnshop loan had savings, just in case (see James and Suto 2011) . Hence, they did not need to rely on pawnshop loans.
The results for FreLoan have another implication: regular borrowers did not increase their borrowing frequency. This finding is interpreted as rational behavior because the increase in the frequency of pawnshop loans required more total interest than the increase in the average loan amount if the total loan amounts were equal.
As described above, poor people took out larger loans from pawnshops than usual following the influenza pandemic. However, borrowers may not have redeemed their pawn when they took out a loan from a pawnshop to cope with an unexpected shock. In this case, our results mean that poor people used pawnshops to obtain money by selling their goods rather than through loans. To determine whether borrowers redeemed their pawn even when struck by the unforeseen influenza pandemic, we estimate the impact on the redemption rate by employing the same specification as in columns (7)- (9) in Table 2 except for the dependent variable. Table 4 shows the results for the proportion of redemption to the sum of redemption and foreclosure (%). Clearly, the estimated coefficients of the crude death rate are insignificant regardless of the sample used. Since the redemption rate around 1920 was approximately 90% (i.e., 89.20% as reported in Notes: The dependent variable is the redemption rate (%). Details of the data sources of each variable used in the regressions are provided in the text and Appendix A. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Table 1 or 90.75%, which is the mean value in the full sample), this result is interpreted as evidence that most people who took out a pawnshop loan to address the health shock could redeem their pawn. On the basis of some assumptions, we provide a more detailed interpretation of our estimation results as follows. The average crude death rates of our full sample in 1918, 1920, and at all other times are 26.84, 25.57, and 21.84, respectively . Therefore, the estimated coefficient in column (7) in Table 2 suggests that the amount of pawnshop loans increased by 5.00% in 1980 and 3.73% in 1920 because of the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic. Assuming that the total amount of loans that pawnshops would have made in 1918 and 1920 if the pandemic had not occurred was equal to the loan amount in 1924, namely 137,416,160 yen (see Table 1 ), it seems that 6,870,808 and 5,125,623 yen were borrowed to cover the losses caused by the adverse health shock. Further, under the assumption that the poverty rate was 9% at that time and only the poor among the 23,580,495 affected people (see Section 2.2) borrowed more money from pawnshops than usual, the increase in victims' pawnshop loan amount per capita is calculated to be 5.65 yen.
Effects of pawnshop loans
In the previous section, we found that the amount of pawnshop loans rose in response to the pandemic shock. Then, what benefits did taking out pawnshop loans provide? As one of the likely benefits, we focus on the effect on the unemployment rate. While the unemployment rate, which we calculate by using census data, was 2.75% in 1920, the unemployment problem was so serious at that time because no formal unemployment insurance existed in Japan before 1947 (Krämer 2013) . Indeed, the government enforced the Employment Placement Act in 1921 and established the Employment Placement Bureau in 1923 to provide unemployment measures.
We expect that the influenza pandemic had an adverse effect on the unemployment rate, but pawnshop loans mitigated the effect through the following mechanism. Influenza infection forced people to be temporarily unable to work and gain an income. Therefore, affected poor people who had no savings faced food insecurity. Hence, their body might be irretrievably damaged by the burden of influenza and a lack of nutrition. However, taking out a pawnshop loan and buying food could help them avoid such fatal damage.
The estimation equation has the following form:
where i indexes municipalities from 1 to 339. U nemployment i is the unemployment rate defined as the percentage of unemployed people of those who have a primary occupation.
14 As in the previous section, CDR i is the crude death rate and Loan i is the logarithm of the total amount of pawnshop loans. The coefficient of the interaction term CDR i × Loan i , which is of interest, indicates the mitigating effect of pawnshop loans on the adverse impact of health damage. x i is a vector of the control variables, namely the logarithm of the population, the share of people aged 15-59, and the ratio of women to men. i is a random error term. Table 5 presents the regression results for the unemployment rate. Column (1) displays the result by using only the crude death rate, the loan amount, and their interaction term. As expected, the coefficients of the crude death rate and interaction term are positive and negative, respectively. The significant effects remain after controlling for the covariates, as reported in column (2). In column (3), we further include indicator variables for the prefectures to control for the differences among them, and there are no major changes. These results suggest that pawnshop loans helped victims of the influenza pandemic recover and return to work. Column (4) shows the result where the city dummy, which takes the value one for cities, is included. The coefficients of CDR and CDR × Loan are still statistically significant, while the magnitudes decrease by about half. Assuming that the increase in the crude death rate due to the pandemic in 1920 was 3.73 (see Section 4.1), our estimate in column (4) indicates that the increase in the unemployment rate by the pandemic would have been 2.11% if nobody had taken loans from pawnshops. In other words, the pandemic would have increased the unemployment rate, which was 2.75%, by more than three-quarters. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is −0.060 and the mean of Loan is 10.62. Therefore, a reasonable marginal effect of CDR 14 In the Japanese census in 1920, unemployed people were categorized as those who have a primary occupation (Statistics Bureau of the Cabinet 1929). is calculated to be −0.072. This finding suggests that the adverse effect of the influenza pandemic on the unemployment rate was offset by pawnshop loans.
Conclusion
In this study, we focused on pawnshop loans to examine a risk-coping strategy of poor people in prewar Japan. The natural experiment exploiting the 1918-1920 influenza pandemic enabled us to identify the response of pawnshop loans to such an adverse health shock. By using data on pawnshop loans in more than 250 municipalities between 1915 and 1924, we found that the loan amount increased by 3.73-5.00% because of the influenza pandemic. In addition, the redemption rate was stable at a high level regardless of the intensity of the shock. These findings suggest that people took out pawnshop loans to cope with the health shock. Our finding that regular users, who were generally from the lowincome class, borrowed more money than usual following the unforeseen shock, indicates that pawnshop loans were a common risk-coping strategy for poor people in prewar Japan. However, our estimation results also indicate that those who had not usually taken out pawnshop loans did not rely on pawnshops even when the pandemic occurred. Thus, if they were relatively rich people and could smooth their consumption through interestfree methods such as savings, the difference in the risk-coping strategies that depended on income level exacerbated economic inequality, as Saaritsa (2011) remarked.
Nevertheless, further analyses showed that pawnshop loans were likely to help poor people avoid falling into a more difficult situation. Using census data for 1920, we confirmed that the loans prevented the unemployment rate from increasing because of the influenza pandemic. If there had not been this mitigating effect, the unemployment rate would have risen by three-quarters. In early twentieth-century Japan, where formal systems of social insurance were underdeveloped, pawnshops thus played an important role as an informal social insurance system.
